Non professional investors display a much higher degree of home bias than …nancial investors suggesting that they might be more severely a¤ected by information asymmetry issues. In particular, non professional investors, having less easily access to information on foreign …rm-speci…c characteristics than institutional investors, will rely more heavily on country-speci…c factors. We test this conjecture restricting the analysis to foreign equity portfolios of four European investing countries -France, Italy, Spain and Sweden. We …nd, indeed, that households' portfolios are more strongly in ‡uenced by proximity variables, transparency of the destination stock market and, even more interestingly, by common-listing in the Euronext platform. JEL: F30, G11, G15
Introduction
Standard asset pricing models assume that assets are held by a representative agent and, even when this assumption is relaxed, little investigation is devoted to the most obvious source of heterogeneity: investment can be made by individual investors or by professionally-managed funds. Very few works analyze the di¤erent investing behavior of individuals and institutional investors. Some notable exceptions are Lakonishov and Maberly (1990) 1 , Cohen (2003) 2 and Jain (2007) . 3 These works, however, analyze the di¤erent trading patterns without investigating the possible different impact of information asymmetry on these two broad categories of investors. 4 The objective of the present work is testing whether investors with a di¤erent degree of sophistication are di¤erently a¤ected by informational asymmetry. The only paper -to our knowledge-addressing, at least partially, this issue is by Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) : they consider Finnish institutional sectors investing in domestic …rms …nding that familiarity factors 5 -distance, language and culture-play a stronger role for less sophisticated investors, such as households and non pro…t institutions. 6 1 They document di¤erences in trading patterns of individuals and institutional investors for high frequency transactions to explain the so-called weekend e¤ect. 2 He …nds that individuals reduce their exposure to equities more than institutions during the trough of the business cycle buying stocks from institutions after market increases and selling after market decreases. 3 He shows that individual investors prefer to invest in dividend-paying …rms whereas institutional investors-relatively lower-taxed-tend to prefer …rms engaging in larger share repurchases. 4 Actually, the informational superiority of institutional investors on individuals is a crucial point in Jain (2007) but it is postulated and never tested. 5 Note that we will use the expression familiarity factors and proximity variables as synonims throughout the paper. However, proximity variables represent a quite narrow subset of proxies capturing investment barriers. Other relevant factors might indeed di¤erently impact portfolio positions according to the degree of sophistication of investors thus weakening or further reinforcing the proximity e¤ect. We depart from Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) work since, allowing for international portfolio diversi…cation, we can test the di¤erent role of a larger set of country-speci…c variables in driving portfolio allocation decisions. In particular, households, typically non professional investors, will have less easily access to information on …rm-speci…c characteristics than institutional investors and will be more in ‡uenced by country-speci…c factors. We focus on foreign investment at market level rather than on domestic investment at individual …rm level (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001 ). Furthermore, relying on the international equity dataset, we consider, beyond the proximity variables, also other country-speci…c factors capturing informational barriers and which might potentially have a di¤erent impact for investors with various degrees of sophistication.
The higher degree of home bias in households' portfolios with respect to professional investors is a signal that they might be more severely a¤ected by information asymmetry and, consequently, are likely to bene…t more from its alleviation. We test this conjecture considering the determinants of foreign equity portfolios of households 7 and professional investors for four European investing countries -France, Italy, Spain and Sweden. In our work, we investigate the impact of informational asymme- 7 Note that, throughout the paper, we adopt the term households meaning households and no pro…t organizations. In fact, for data comparability across countries and for data matching between CPIS and OECD National Accounts (see Appendix C) we consider non pro…t organizationsrepresenting an almost negligible fraction-and households as the same consolidated sector. The results of Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) on the similar responsiveness of households and non pro…t organizations to geographical and cultural distances seem to legitimate this consolidation. try for households and …nancial investors by considering the di¤erent role of country-speci…c factors in foreign equity portfolios. We consider, among the country-level determinants, proximity variables such as distance, common border and common language. They have been extensively used in the trade literature as determinants of trade ‡ows between countries and, more recently, the same approach has been used for equity ‡ows (Portes et al., 2001; Portes and Rey, 2005) and equity holdings (Chan et al., 2005 among the others). However, these variables have been included considering, as investor, either the overall economy (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2005, 2007 ; Sorensen et al., 2007; Amadi, 2004; Faruqee et al., 2004) or mutual funds (Chan et al., 2005) . We consider, instead, as in Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) , di¤erent institutional investing sectors in order to detect whether the strength of the impact of proximity variables on stockholding is related to the degree of sophistication of the investor. Furthermore, previous literature has mainly documented that unenforceable contracts, legal and regulation complexity unequivocally deter foreign direct investments. Recently, Gelos and Wei (2005) …nd that country transparency a¤ects also portfolio investment in emerging markets. We check the role of "opacity" in determining foreign portfolio investments in developed markets and test whether this role -if any-is stronger for less sophisticated investors to which …rm-speci…c information may be available less easily than to …nancial investors. Finally, …rms' stocks listing in foreign markets have evidenced to alleviate informational asymmetries and to be more present in foreign portfolios (Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001; Pagano et al., 2002) . Ahearne et al. (2004) show that, at aggregate level, the higher the portion of a country's market that has a public US listing the higher the country's weight in the US portfolio. However, the literature has never explicitly tested, to the best of our knowledge, the informational e¤ect of stock market consolidation. The merger of national exchange markets into a common exchange market might, in fact, play a role in reducing information asymmetry and its e¤ect on portfolio allocation might depend on the investor's degree of sophistication. We consider the role of the common exchange market Euronext, controlling for the liquidity e¤ect in order to disentangle the informational component.
Our results point out to a stronger impact of proximity variables and transparency of the destination stock market for households. Moreover, we …nd a crucial role of common-listing, controlling for liquidity, only for less sophisticated investors: …rms publicly listing in a common exchange -such as Euronext-are subject to standardized regulations and homogenizations of accounting rules with the e¤ect of alleviating information asymmetry for households directly investing in the stock market.
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is worth making two important considerations.
The …rst point concerns households' a priori choice to invest their …nancial wealth directly on the stock market or through …nancial intermediation. Households may decide to invest directly in the stock market since the higher expected gain (if any) determined by the intermediated investment is below the intermediation cost. Assuming that the expected reward to risk ratio of intermediated investment is common knowledge and that all households face the same cost for intermediation, the choice on whether investing directly or not depends on the household-speci…c degree of information a¤ecting the (perceived) riskiness of direct investment. In these terms, considering di¤erent degree of information level in the households, we can imagine a marginal investor for which the cost of indirect investment equals the bene…t in terms of reduced perceived return variability. All investors with an information level lower than the marginal investor will buy the …nancial intermediation service while households with an easier access to information than the marginal investor will choose to invest directly on the stock market. The focus of this work is on di¤erent strategies of end-investors and, consequently, we restrict the analysis to the self-selected better informed investing households who decide to invest directly on the stock market. Hence, our results, revealing the stronger impact of information asymmetry for households than for …nancial institutions, do hold for a self-selected better informed fraction of households and should hold, even more severely, for the (unobservable) fraction of households investing indirectly through …nancial institutions.
The second aspect worth stressing is the direct linkage of our research with the literature on lack of diversi…cation of households in the stock market (Campbell, 2006) 8 . Lack of diversi…cation and preference for local assets has been found both in aggregate data (Lewis, 1999) and in household-level data. For instance, Huberman (2001) …nds that individual investors prefer to own the stocks of their local telecommunication company. Feng and Seasholes (2004) …nd that Chinese individ- 8 It is interesting to note that also the literature on the so-called stockholding puzzle is, indirectly, related to our research. Guiso and Jappelli (2005) point out the (un)awareness of the menu of assets available -and so information costs and barriers-as explanation for the stockholding puzzle (or lack of participation puzzle). Merton (1987), in fact, points out that investors purchase only securities they know about. In some way, the lack of diversi…cation can be seen as non participation to foreign stock market. In fact, if unawareness (Guiso and Jappelli, 2005) or …xed entry costs (Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995; Vissing-Jorgensen, 2003) are plausible explanations for households lack of participation to stock market, the same motives -more broadly de…ned as information asymmetry between home and foreign investors-can be seen as responsible of their lack of participation in foreign stock market, that is of lack of diversi…cation of households. 6 ual investors overweight not only local companies but also companies traded on a local exchange suggesting a connection between cross-listing reasons and familiarity.
The fact that households are more heavily a¤ected by informational issues is immediately evident looking at the higher fraction of domestic assets held by households than by …nancial investors. When restricting the analysis to foreign stocks, we …nd that households and non pro…t organization are more prone to invest in stocks closer in cultural and geographical terms, more reluctant to invest in more opaque stock markets and attracted by stocks listed in their own stock exchange. Since investing households are more heavily a¤ected by information issues than …nancial institutions, the removal of these barriers should bene…t households relatively more and increase their international diversi…cation.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we illustrate the econometric setting and in Section 3 we implement the empirical analysis and derive results. Section 4 concludes.
Estimable equation
Our theoretical framework is very standard and simply captures the equilibrium portfolio allocations when investors are supposed to face di¤erent costs investing in N stock markets. We adopt Gehrig (1993) approach in modelling information asymmetries and, more in general, investment barriers 9 . In Gehrig (1993) contribution 9 In order to dissipate any possible source of confusion we want immediately to de…ne which is the interpretation of asymmetric information we will spouse throughout the paper. In a standard setting with asymmetric information (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980) an informed investor has a lower perceived variance due to its private signal but, at the same time, her perceived expected return is generally also di¤erent from the uninformed investor's. It implies that we should sometimes observe "foreign-bias" when the domestic investors observe bad signals. What we, instead, 7 foreign investments appear on average more risky to domestic investors -leading to an information-based justi…cation to home bias-and the portfolio of each investor is di¤erent depending on the perceived variance-covariance matrix. We consider this approach focussing on foreign investment only, considering a di¤erent investor-speci…c perceived variability of return for each foreign stock index in the investment opportunity set. Details on the derivation of the model are provided in Appendix A.
When considering di¤erent investors k in the same country l the optimal portfolio weight in asset j (w k lj ) is
where M S j is the market share of asset j and 1 D k lj represents the relative (with respect to world average) "advantage" of sector k in country l investing in asset j 10 .
In other words, the sector k in country l will demand a share of asset j greater than its market share in proportion to 1 D k lj (inverse of relative investment cost). 11 label "information asymmetries" is closer to the concept of "model uncertainty" or "Knightian uncertainty" (Epstein and Miao, 2003 and Uppal and Wang, 2003) : roughly speaking, the foreign investor's perceived uncertainty is higher than that of the domestic investor, though both have the same perceived return. This approach may help to understand home bias because small di¤erences in the ambiguity about the return distributions can lead to largely under-diversi…ed portfolio holding. Our formulation is a special case of ambiguity aversion: foreign investors believe that the true variance is in the interval [ l ; h ] and so they behave as if the variance were h . The same reasoning applies when considering the allocation in several foreign stock markets rather than the choice home-foreign assets. 10 D k lj represents the relative barrier (with respect to world average) of sector k in country l investing in asset j: 11 Note that if D k lj = 1, i.e. if the investment barrier for sector k in country l is equal to the average one then the market share of asset j will be optimally held in equilibrium.
The ratio w k lj M S j can be interpreted as the bias in asset j by investor k in country l : if the actual position w k lj is larger than j's market share then there is a positive bias while a ratio lower than one reveals a negative bias. The above relation implies that the bias in asset j by investor k residing in country l depends upon the reciprocal of the bilateral speci…c investment barrier relative to the world average investment barrier. In other words, the larger the bilateral speci…c investment barrier relative to the world average the lower the actual position in a given asset 12 .
Since we are considering the institutional sector as investors we estimate a separate pooled-OLS regression for each institutional sector k for all investing countries.
We adopt a "Least Square Dummy Variable Estimation" with …xed e¤ects for investing countries, time dummy and White correction of variance-covariance matrix.
Since D k lj is not directly observable we have to estimate the equation making use of proxies. In order to capture the unobservable 1 D k lj variable we consider i di¤erent proxies, denoted by rel_proxy i kj to emphasize that what matters in determining the wedge between the actual position and the market share is the relative investment barrier with respect to the world average barrier. However, since proxies at investor level -households or …nancial investors-are not available we have to rely on common country-speci…c variables for investors residing in the same country but we allow for a di¤erent sector-speci…c role of the same variables in the portfolio choice problem. In other words, in the model we assume a di¤erent perceived variance at investor level while in the empirical implementation, constrained by data availability, we just consider di¤erent elasticities of …nancial investors and households to the same country-speci…c proxy. In the actual regression analysis we also include some dummies which might, a priori, capture investment barriers. Consequently, our …nal estimable regression, including i regressors and n dummies, will be the following
After having implemented a regression for households and …nancial investors we test whether the coe¢cients are statistically di¤erent by running the following complementary regression
where the subscripts H and F denote, respectively, households and …nancial investors. The coe¢cient i is equal to ( i;H i;F ) and n is equal to ( n;H n;F ). By testing the null hypothesis that i = 0 (and analogously for n ) we test the hypothesis that country-level factors are equally important in determining portfolio allocation for more sophisticated investors -professional investors-and less sophisticated investors -households 13 . Results against the null hypothesis, that is coe¢cients signi…cantly di¤erent from zero in the expected direction 14 , support, in statistical terms, our thesis 15 .
Empirical analysis
We 13 In this paper we focus on the informational motive ignoring any other factor such as hedging motives. This restricted perspective, although debatable, is supported by two key considerations. The …rst one is that hedging motives have shown to have a negligible explanatory power for the home bias phenomenon (Cooper and Kaplanis, 1994; Baxter and Jermann, 1997) . The second is that, in order to signi…cantly a¤ect our results, one should claim that the excluded factors are expected to have a di¤erent impact for di¤erent investors. In fact, the e¤ect of all possible determinants -not only hedging motives-left out of the analysis do cancel out if they enter simmetrically for all investors so leaving una¤ected our results. 14 The sign of the coe¢cient depends on whether the proxy is aimed at capturing investment barrier rather than reduction in investment barrier. 15 Please note that the above regression (??) allows to test the di¤erence in coe¢cients without performing the Wald test which would require a computationally heavier procedure -for instance a Seemingly Unrelated Regression-in order to compare coe¢cients of separate regressions. 16 See Appendix C for further details on data.
Sorensen et al., 2007) but none -to the best of our knowledge-exploits the breakdown by investing sector.
We consider two investing categories: the households' sector comprising households and non pro…t organizations and the …nancial investors' sector comprising banks, pension funds and insurance companies, mutual funds and other …nancial auxiliaries.
The destination stock markets are 20 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United
The way di¤erent variables a¤ect foreign holdings depends on how domestic and foreign investors evaluate these factors for investment purposes. The total market capitalization in any country must be held in aggregate by some investors so a country cannot be underweighted in portfolio by all investors. French and Poterba (1991) suggest that investors may simply be relatively more optimistic about their domestic markets. This assertion is con…rmed by Strong and Xu (2003) and Li (2004) showing, using di¤erent datasets, as fund managers or investors in general are more optimistic about their home stock market. Notwithstanding the notable attempts proposed in the literature (Lewis, 1999) , the strong familiarity factor behind home bias is still hard to be captured making asymmetric-for domestic and foreign investors-the impact of an observable stock characteristic on investment decisions. If a country-speci…c factor lowers costs symmetrically for home and foreign investors there will be no impact on foreign position. If, on the contrary, it lowers (increases) the deadweight cost for foreign more than for domestic investors then more (fewer) foreign investors will be attracted to invest in the country and fewer (more) domestic will hold local equities.
When looking at the portfolio composition into domestic and foreign equities in table 1 we …nd some interesting regularities. First, all four countries considered display home bias with a domestic position ranging from 0.55 to 0.78. Second, the home bias for households is much larger than for …nancial investors: the domestic share for households ranges from 0.76 for Italy to 0.94 for Spain while for professional investors the range goes from 0.29 for Italy to 0.60 for France. This preliminary evidence suggests that, at least for the countries considered, investment patterns for households and …nancial investors might be quite di¤erent and it is worth investigating whether a similar degree of diversity is present also within the foreign portfolio and which are its main determinants. Since now on, in our work we will ignore any explicit explanation relative to the home bias phenomenon and focus on the determinants of foreign positions 18 .
Portfolio determinants of households and …nancial investors
We claim that since households have less easily access to foreign …rm-level information they rely much more heavily on country-level factors.
In this section we consider results from regression (4) The variables we include as capturing proximity are distance, common border dummy and common language dummy 19 . The …rst two variables simply capture physical distance between the country of the investor and the destination country 20 . 19 See Appendix B for further details. 20 A separate role for the dummy border can be found when considering this variable as "correcting" the distance variable which is measured as the great circle distance between the capital cities of the destination and investing country. Please note that the variable entering our regression is the Since transactions in …nancial assets are "weightless" a role for distance may be found only if it has an informational content (Portes and Rey, 2005) . The role for the common language dummy is more easily interpretable as foreign languages makes more di¢cult collecting information and this is likely to be a serious issue mainly for non professional investors.
We expect to …nd a stronger role of proximity variables for households than for …nancial investors, as already found by Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) for Finland.
The …rst noticeable result, looking at columns (1) in Table 2 and Table 3 , is the strong explanatory power of these regressors. The Adj-R 2 is indeed 39% for professional investors and to 52% for households denoting a relatively stronger role for households. The second point to stress is that the impact of the proximity variables is strongly signi…cant in statistical terms and quite large in economic terms for both …nancial investors and households. Finally, the coe¢cients are much larger for households than for …nancial investors. The point estimate of the elasticity between the ratio of portfolio share to market share and the distance is about -1.3 for households and -0.9 for …nancial investors while point estimates are more than twice as large for households in the proximity dummies (border and language). In particular, contiguity enhances the portfolio share to market share ratio by more than 50% for …nancial investors (e 0:448 = 1:565) while for households sharing a common border induces investments such that the portfolio share to market share ratio is 2.5 times larger. Sharing a common language has almost the same quantitative e¤ect than contiguity for …nancial investors while it has a much stronger impact for households relative distance between investing and destination country (see Appendix B for further details).
increasing portfolio share to market share by 6 times.
Transparency We include, as potential explanatory variable, an index capturing the degree of opacity of the destination countries (Kurtzman et al., 2004) . 21 The empirical literature on …nancial investments has assessed the relevance of small scale risks: fraudulent transactions, bribery, unenforceable contracts, legal and regulation complexity unequivocally deter investment. Previous literature has mainly documented that these institutional factors a¤ect foreign direct investments. Recently, Gelos and Wei (2005) , adopting opacity indexes similar to the one considered here, …nd that country transparency a¤ects also portfolio investment in emerging markets.
We check whether a role of opacity in foreign portfolio investments exists also when restricting the analysis to developed stock markets and whether this role -if anyis stronger for less sophisticated investors to which …rm-speci…c information may be available less easily than to …nancial investors.
Interestingly, this relative opacity index shows the expected negative sign for both investors but is statistically signi…cant only for households (column 2). The elasticity is higher than 1 so quite large in economic terms: an increase of the relative opacity index by 50% halves the portfolio share to market share ratio. After the inclusion of the opacity index, the proximity variables coe¢cients appear substantially unchanged for professional investors, where this proxy has no signi…cant impact, but also coe¢cients of proximity variables for households are only modestly a¤ected. Therefore, our results seem to suggest that transparency of a country enhances foreign portfolio investments alleviating information asymmetry only for non professional investors. Following this perspective, we consider the e¤ects of the Euronext creation. In September 2000 the Euronext is formed by the stock exchanges of Paris, Brussels and Amsterdam. In February 2002 Euronext continues to grow and merges with the Portuguese exchange 23 . We add the Euronext-dummy to our regression in order to check whether forming a common stock exchange with standardized …nancial regulations may be perceived by investors as a reduction of information barriers. Moreover, if the common listing has an informational content then we would expect it to be stronger for households than for …nancial investors who may rely more easily on other more speci…c (and costly) sources of information. Results reported in column 3, indeed, support our conjecture. The coe¢cient has the expected positive sign for both kinds 22 Following a similar perspective, Vlachos (2004) highlights the relevance of regulatory harmonization as determinant of cross-country portfolio holdings based on the CPIS dataset. 23 In 2002 Euronext merges also with the LIFFE (London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange). This merger is, however, not considered here since it is a future exchange and not strictly a stock exchange. In April 2007, Euronext merged with NYSE (New York Stock Exchange) creating the larger stock exchange in the world. For obvious reasons, this merger cannot be object of investigation in the present work. of investors but is large and statistically signi…cant only for households: trading in a common stock exchange platform increases the portfolio share to market share ratio by about three times. Padilla and Pagano (2006) have recently found that the integration of the Amsterdam, Brussels, Lisbon and Paris exchanges in a single platform resulted in a signi…cant increase in liquidity 24 . Therefore, in order to exactly pick up the informational Euronext e¤ect, it is crucial accounting also for liquidity.
Control for liquidity
We consider a variable capturing the relative illiquidity of the market adopted by Bortolotti et al. (2007) . It is a measure of price impact which is the aggregate version of Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure. The market illiquidity of a stock market is de…ned as the ratio of absolute return on the stock index to turnover, capturing the response of the stock index return to turnover. Since our portfolio holdings are recorded at annual frequency we need an average annual illiquidity measure. We compute the illiquidity of a stock market in year t as the annual average of daily illiquidity where d represents the day, jR dt j is the absolute return on day d and D is the number of trading days in year t: 25 T U RN dt represents the total value of shares traded scaled by total daily market capitalization.
The higher the reaction of stock index return to a given turnover rate, the higher 24 Sarkissian and Shill (2004) point out some evidence on the role of liquidity in the choice of listing abroad. 25 The index return and turnover rates are computed as the weighted average of all stocks included in the index (each stock is weighted by its relative stock market capitalization). the illiquidity of the stock market. In particular we consider the logarithm of the relative illiquidity measure capturing the relative illiquidity of the stock market j relative to the world illiquidity 26 . Results in column 4a show that the illiquidity measure has the expected negative sign and is signi…cant for both types of investors, although the coe¢cient point estimate is more than two times larger for households than for …nancial investors. The same result applies when considering the annual turnover rate (column 4b) as alternative 27 , and more commonly adopted, measure of liquidity (Levine, 1997 
These results con…rm that the Euronext dummy has an informational content per se further stressing the high relevance of aggregate informational barriers for less sophisticated investors 28 . 26 The same procedure is followed when we consider the turover rate as alternative to the illiquidity measure. 27 The two alternative measures of liquidity/illiquidity we consider have an average correlation coe¢cient equal to -0.53. It evidences, on one side, the existence of a strong linkage among them and, on the other, the fact that they must capture di¤erent aspects as their correlation coe¢cient is far below unity. As pointed out in Bortolotti et al. (2007) , the Amihud (2002) index is a better proxy for market (il)liquidity than the turnover ratio since the latter may not account for all aspects of market liquidity (Hasbrouk, 2003). 28 As pointed out by Padilla and Pagano (2005) , the merger of stock exchanges also determines a reduction in direct costs. However, since …nancial investors are those who more frequently turnover their portfolios they should be more a¤ected than households by these costs. Under this consideration, the fact that the Euronext-dummy plays a role for households supports even more strongly our informational hypothesis.
Control for EMU Finally, since members in Euronext are also EMU members, the Euronext e¤ect could simply capture the relative attractiveness of EMU countries for EMU due to elimination of exchange rate risk documented in the recent literature (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007; Berkel, 2004) . We therefore include the EMU dummy in our analysis in order to disentangle the informational impact of Euronext 29 . Results in columns 4a and 4b show that the Euro dummy is, for both investors, economically and statistically relevant: sharing a common currency determines portfolio share to market share ratio much larger than for non members of currency unions (5 times larger for …nancial investors and more than 8 times larger for households). It is worth noticing that controlling for liquidity and for the EMU dummy does actually reduce the impact of the Euronext dummy for households but the coe¢cient remains very large: investing in countries listing in a common exchange market increases the dependent variable by 2.4 times rather than by 3 times.
Additional results and robustness check
Return-chasing or contrarian trading? In Gompers and Metricks (2001) love for liquidity as well as contrarian trading behavior are identi…ed as characteristics of large investors. Since households are, typically, small investors, there might be some variables included in our analysis correlated with past reward to risk ratio and so in ‡uencing our results. We therefore include the relative lagged Sharpe ratio 30 in our regression analysis showing the relative results in column 5 of each table 31 . We 29 Note that, among investors, Italy and Spain are EMU but not Euronext members and, among destination countries, Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy, Spain are EMU but not Euronext members 30 See Appendix B for details. 31 Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005) consider the same regressor …nding mixed results on its significance for the representative country investor. 20 …nd no signi…cant role for lagged Sharpe ratio neither for households nor for …nancial investors and other coe¢cients are left almost unchanged.
Restrictions to capital mobility Finally, we add, as further control, a variable capturing direct investment barriers that is restrictions to international capital mobility. The strand of literature trying to explain the lack of portfolio diversi…cation through the existence of barriers to international investment dates back to contributions by Black (1974) , Stulz (1981) and Errunza and Losq (1981 32 . However, it is worth stressing that the institutional explanation has revealed to be unsatisfactory when considering aggregate investment by the representative country investor or by particular institutional investors, typically mutual funds (Chan et al., 2005) . In fact, direct costs might have, a priori, a di¤erent impact on households and …nancial investors since they operate on a diverse scale 33 . Consequently, we include here the direct costs' explanation of cross-border investment as it could interact with our results on informational barriers. 32 When considering only OECD destination countries, the "source component" of capital control is statistically signi…cant. Note that table 4, considering all institutional sectors, includes also government and non …nancial corporations (excluded from the analysis) beyond households and …nancial institutions. 33 Financial investors, typically larger and more sophisticated, may be rationally less a¤ected by costly procedures to foreign investment.
Since it is not so easy to identify a bilateral speci…c cost, C lj , it is decomposed into two components: the "source component" (C l ), i.e. the costs that investor faces to transfer funds out of her own country l, and the "host component" (C j ), i.e. the cost faced to "enter"country j:
We adopt an index measuring the restrictions countries impose on capital ‡ows derived from the Economic Freedom Network (Chan et al., 2005, among the others, adopt the same index) 34 . It is an index (0-10) assigning a lower rating to countries with more restrictions on foreign capital transactions 35 . We consider the relative host (source) capital mobility index, that is the index of capital mobility of the destination market j (investing country l) divided by the average capital mobility index.
Our results, displayed in column 6, show how the "source component" of capital mobility variables has, indeed, a relevant explanatory power for both types of investors with a stronger impact for households.
Summing up, the important result is that, even after controlling for past reward to risk ratio and capital control, our results on the di¤erent impact of country-level informational asymmetry are still there.
No Hong Kong and Singapore Finally, we run the above regression excluding Hong Kong and Singapore from the pool of destination stock markets for 34 Edison and Warnock (2003) propose an alternative measure of capital controls based on International Finance Corporation's (IFC) emerging market indices. However, it cannot be adopted here since we restrict the analysis to developed countries. 35 See Appendix B for further details. 
Testing di¤erences households-…nancial investors
To test the di¤erent impact of informational barriers on households portfolio choice with respect to …nancial investors, we run regression (5) where the dependent variable is the log(w H lj =w F lj ) and the coe¢cients exactly capture the wedge in sensitivity to country-level factors by households with respect to …nancial investors. Results are reported in table 5. Had the e¤ect of one regressor been equal for households and professional investors we should have observed its coe¢cient equal to zero, or not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. For instance, the hypothesis of null coe¢cient for distance is not rejected so revealing that the e¤ect of this variable on the two kinds of investors is not statistically di¤erent. For the other proximity variables (border and language), for opacity and the Euronext dummy the coe¢cient is statistically di¤erent from zero 36 underlying a signi…cant di¤erent impact of these variables on households and …nancial investors in the expected direction. Summing up, with the exception of distance, for all other variables capturing information asymmetry at country-level the e¤ect on households is statistically larger than on …nancial investors.
Sensitivity analysis: one country out As a …nal robustness check, we consider whether our results, based on a pooled regression including four countries, are driven by one particular investing country. We display our regression results in columns 2a, 3a, 4a and 5a of table 5 when, respectively, France, Italy, Spain or Sweden are excluded from the sample 37 . The coe¢cients show some variability when one country is excluded 38 but the evidence shows that our results are -comfortinglynot driven by one single country since the wedge households-…nancial investors remains even after the alternative exclusion of all countries. In columns (#b) the same results are reported when only OECD countries are included in the pool of destination countries. Under all sample speci…cations, the variables proxying information asymmetry -with the exception of distance-display a signi…cantly larger impact for households than for professional investors con…rming our initial conjecture 39 .
Conclusions
We analyze the determinants of foreign portfolio allocations of more sophisticated investors -…nancial investors-and less sophisticated investors -households-in four European countries, France, Italy, Spain and Sweden. Di¤erent degree of sophistication implies di¤erent access to …rms' speci…c information and it may result in di¤erent demand patterns. We evidence that households' foreign portfolio investments are more heavily in ‡uenced by country-level informational barriers. In particular, we uncover for households a stronger impact of proximity variables, transparency of the destination stock market and a relevant role for the common stock exchange market -Euronext -in enhancing information disclosure. This evidence highlights that differences in the investment patterns of households and institutional investors might be driven by the di¤erent degree of sophistication. Consequently, technological advances reducing "distance" among markets and any e¤ort of improving transparency on …nancial markets will plausibly result in a higher international portfolio diversi…cation of households' portfolio investment. Furthermore, this is the …rst work, to our knowledge, detecting a signi…cant informational role of the Euronext stock exchange merger: less informed investors seem to bene…t from the information disclosure mech- 39 It is worth pointing out how our results are not driven by the di¤erent positions of households and …nancial investors in domestic assets. In fact, the logarithmic speci…cation makes coe¢cients invariant to scale factors. In other words, if the households' foreign portfolio composition were equal to the …nancial investors' one except for the dimension of the foreign portfolio in the overall portfolio, the coe¢cients on our regressors would be identical and the scale factor would be captured by the intercept. anisms connected with the common listing. In this turmoil period of stock market consolidations, this result suggests that the convergence towards a common exchange platform might represent an e¤ective mechanism alleviating information asymmetry and enhancing international diversi…cation for households. 
A Theoretical framework
Our theoretical framework is very standard and simply captures the equilibrium portfolio allocations when investors are supposed to face di¤erent costs investing in N stock markets. We assume our investor maximizes the expected value of a constant relative risk aversion utility function
where is the coe¢cient of relative risk aversion and W is …nancial wealth. The expected utility may be rewritten as
where w is the vector of weights, is the vector of expected excess returns and is the variance-covariance matrix of stock returns.
Maximizing the above expected utility under the constraint N X s=1 w s = 1 we get the standard mean-variance vector of optimal weights w = 1 1 ( ri)
We adopt Gehrig (1993) approach in modelling information asymmetries (and in general investment barriers). In Gehrig (1993) contribution foreign investments appear on average more risky to domestic investors -leading to an information-based justi…cation to home bias-and the portfolio of each investor is di¤erent depending on the perceived variance-covariance matrix. We consider this approach focussing on foreign investment only, considering a di¤erent investor-speci…c perceived variability of stock returns for each foreign stock index in the investment opportunity set.
Denoting by C l the matrix of investment barriers we rewrite the personalized vector of weights for each investor l in the following way
where l = C l (and therefore 1 l = C 1 l 1 ). We obtain 31
The diagonal N xN positive de…nite matrix C l may be de…ned as where C lj is the bilateral cost of holding country j's stock by country l's investor.
As C lj stands for the investment barrier cost for country l investing in j , its reciprocal 1 C lj stands for a variable capturing the investment "advantage" of country l investing in country j. Therefore the equilibrium condition, equating stock demand and stock supply, will be
where MS represents the vector of market shares of stock market indexes (supply side) and the right hand side is the (weighted) sum of stock indexes' demands (demand side).
is a diagonal N xN positive de…nite matrix where j = P L l=1 M S l 1 C lj is the average investment "advantage" in holding asset j Let us de…ne D l = C l , where D l is again a diagonal N xN positive de…nite matrix. We can rewrite the above expression (6) as
where D lj = j C lj and
C lj and using the equilibrium condition (7) we get the following result
or, in terms of individual asset, the following optimal portfolio weights
1 D lj represents the relative (with respect to world average) "advantage" of country l investing in asset j. In other words, the investor l will demand a share of assets greater than the market share in proportion to 1 D lj (inverse of relative investment cost). Note that if C lj = j , i.e. if the investment barrier for country l is equal to the average then the investor l will hold the value market share of asset j. The distance is measured as the Great Circle distance in miles between capital cities of source (l) and destination (j) country. The average distance from a destination country (j) is obtained as weighted (by market share) average of the distance of investing countries. The variable included in the regression is the logarithm of the ratio of the distance l j to the average distance from country j:
Border dummy
Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the investing country and the destination country share a common border (0 otherwise).
Language dummy Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the investing country and the destination country share a common language (0 otherwise) opacity index Index capturing the degree of opacity (Kurtzman et al., 2004 ) of a country. It is a synthetic index capturing corruption, ine¢cacy of the legal system, deleterious economic policies, inadequate accounting and governance practices, detrimental regulatory structures. It is a synthetic measure (1-100) of indexes coming from 41 di¤erent sources (World Bank, IMF, International Securities Services Association, International Country Risk Guide and Individual Country's Regulations).
Euronext dummy (Common Stock Exchange dummy) Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the investing country and the destination country share the Euronext stock exchange platform (0 otherwise). In our case, it coincides with a common stock exchange dummy since the investing countries considered did not merge in a common stock exchange with other countries.
EMU dummy (Common Currency dummy) Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the investing country and the destination country are members of the European Monetary Union (0 otherwise). In our case, it coincides with a common currency dummy since do not belong to any other currency union.
illiquidity measure The illiquidity measure is de…ned in the text. The average illiquidity is obtained as weighted (by market share) average of country stock index illiquidity. The variable included in the analysis is the relative illiquidity measure of country j, i.e. the ratio of country j illiquidity on the average illiquidity.
Source: Datastream, Thomson Financials turnover rate The turnover rate is de…ned in the text. The average turnover rate is obtained as weighted (by market share) average of country stock index turnover. The variable included in the analysis is the relative turnover measure of country j, i.e. the ratio of country j turnover on the average turnover.
Source: Datastream, Thomson Financials relative Sharpe ratio Similarly to Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) we consider the average excess return of the country stock market relative to world return, divided by the standard deviation of the excess return's variability.
Source: authors' calculations based on Datastream data. capital mobility index The Economic Freedom Network constructs an index (0-10) measuring the restrictions countries impose on capital ‡ows assigning a lower rating to countries with more restrictions on foreign capital transactions.
In decreasing rating order are ranked countries where domestic investments by foreigners and foreign investments by local residents are unrestricted investments are restricted in a few industries within the countries investments are permitted but regulatory restrictions slow the mobility of capital either domestic investments by foreigners or foreign investments by local residents require approval from government authorities both domestic by foreigners and foreign investments by local require government approval
We consider capital mobility indexes for both the investor country's index and the destination country index as we do not have bilateral speci…c capital control indexes: the barrier of country l investment in country j depends both on the restrictions imposed by country l on outward investment and on the restrictions imposed by country j on inward investment.
C Derived portfolios of institutional investors
Our dependent variable is the logarithm of foreign portfolio shares, that is the share of each foreign stock index in the equity portfolio of a given investor. Foreign equity holdings (in US$) are derived from Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS ) for the years 2001 to 2004. However, the CPIS does not provide domestic holdings. This problem is circumvented by making use of complementary data sources to derive the share of foreign assets in each portfolio (Sorensen et al., 2007; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007; Amadi, 2006) . In particular, we derive the stock market capitalization of each investing country from Datastream and, from International Financial Statistics (IFS ), the foreign liabilities held by each investing country and the foreign equities held by each country. Therefore, country l foreign share is given by the ratio f or equities held by l M CAP l + f or equities held by l f oreign liab held by l = f or equities held by l equities held by country l (11) where the denominator represents the total amount (domestic and foreign) of equities held by country l
As far as the portfolio at institutional sector level is concerned, very few countries in CPIS provide details on the breakdown by sector holder and many countries report incomplete surveys. From CPIS data on foreign holdings by institutional sector we derive the ratio of foreign holdings by sector k on the total amount of equities held by country l f or equities held by sector k in l equities held by country l
In order to obtain the domestic holding position for each investing sector we rely on an additional data source, the OECD National Accounts, Financial Balance Sheets providing information on the fraction of wealth, split by instrument (equities, short term securities, long term securities, etc.), held by a particular institutional sector. Therefore, we derive for each institutional sector k in each country l the ratio equities held by sector k in l equities held by country l
Finally, by taking the ratio of (12) to (13) , we can recover the ratio we are interested in, that is the foreign share in each institutional sector's equity portfolio allowing to derive the share of each foreign country in each sector's portfolio. f or equities held by sector k in l equities held by sector k in l
The investing countries considered -France, Italy, Spain and Sweden-are the only large investing countries providing the sectoral breakdown of equity holdings in the CPIS and in the OECD database.
The households' sector in the text is the aggregation of the Household sector with the Other sector (non pro…t Organizations serving Households). The …nancial sector is obtained by merging Monetary authorities, Banks and Other Financial Institutions. The sectors General Government and Non Financial Companies are not considered in the analysis. (4) in the text. A "Least Square Dummy Variable Estimation" with …xed e¤ects for investing countries is implemented. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the ratio of portfolio share to market share, log(w F lj =M S j ); where the subscript lj represents the couple investment country l -destination country j while the superscript F represents the "…nancial institutions" sector in country l. Table 3 .
Tables

Role of country factors in portfolio allocation: households and non pro…t organizations
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the ratio of portfolio share to market share, log(w H =M S j ); where the subscript lj represents the couple investment country l -destination country j while the superscript H represents the "households and non pro…t institutions" sector in country l. Otherwise the table is the same as table 2. Constants and time dummies are included but not reported. White (1980) cross-section standard errors (d.f. corrected) are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signi…cance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. Table 4 . Role of country factors in portfolio allocation: all investors The dependent variable is the logarithm of the ratio of portfolio share to market share, log(w T OT lj =M S j ); where the subscript lj represents the couple investment country l -destination country j while the superscript T OT indicates the "representative investor" in country l. Otherwise the table is the   same as table 2 and table 3 . Constants and time dummies are included but not reported. White (1980) cross-section standard errors (d.f. corrected) are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signi…cance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. Table 5 . Test of di¤erent impact of country factors for households and …nancial investors
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the ratio of portfolio share of households to portfolio share of …nancial investors, log(w H lj ) log(w F lj ); where the subscript lj represents the couple investment country l -destination country j while the superscript H and F represent, respectively, "households and non pro…t institutions" and "…nancial institutions" in country l. Columns (#a) report values when Hong Kong and Singapore are included in the regression while in columns (#b) values are referred to the case in which only OECD destination countries are considered. . Constants and time dummies are included but not reported. White (1980) cross-section standard errors (d.f. corrected) are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signi…cance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
